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Declaration of the Shi'a of Iraq
[Arabic]
Dear Sir or Madam: We are appending for your consideration the document entitled “Declaration of the Shia of Iraq”. This is the
result of two years of discussions and deliberations by a broad range of academics,
professionals, religious leaders, intellectuals, military personnel, tribal
leaders and businessmen, all of whom were joined by a common concern for the
welfare of Iraq in general and the Shia in particular. The document is aimed at
confronting the issue of sectarianism and the anti-Shia biases of the Iraqi
state. This issue has been one of the great taboos of Iraq even though it
directly and detrimentally affects the lives of the majority of Iraq’s
population. The document strives to elucidate a Shia perspective on the future of
Iraq and the necessary changes that have to be undertaken to reconstruct the
state along lines of fairness and justice. We believe that the decent and
equitable society that all Iraqis deserve cannot be established without
dismantling the entire apparatus of state sectarianism and the deliberate
disadvantaging of the majority community. The signatories believe that Iraq can
only be revivified if its future is based on the three principles of democracy,
federalism and community rights. The Shia in Iraq have suffered from the deliberate targeting of their
community identity, institutions and leadership. In the last two decades, the
level of state repression has reached unprecedented heights, with mass
expulsions, expropriations, destruction of schools and colleges, and wholesale
murder and assassinations of the Shia leadership. The situation that the Shia
face now is truly intolerable. Iraq is at a critical juncture in its history.
The tyranny that has been inflicted on Iraq will pass, but the conditions that
have allowed dictatorship to flourish must be removed once and for all if we
are not to fall back into another form of misrule and oppression. What the Shia
want from the Iraqi state is therefore a genuine and legitimate question. The “Declaration of the Shia of Iraq” aims to answer this
question. Yours truly, Dr Mowaffak Al Rubaie, Dr Ali Allawi & Dr Sahib Al Hakim 19 Beaufort Road London W5 3EB UK Tel +44 7889 969 383 Fax +44 20 8961 6100 E Mail Mow@capitalemployment.com Declaration of the Shia of Iraq Introduction A series of meetings were held in London during 2001 and 2002 to discuss
the sectarian problem in Iraq and its effects on Iraq’s present conditions and
future. A broad range of personalities were involved in these meetings ranging
from intellectuals, politicians, military personnel, writers, tribal chiefs,
academics, to businessmen and professionals, drawn from a wide political
spectrum, including islamists, nationalists, socialists and liberals. These
meetings were not constrained by any particular ideological or organisational
considerations, with the participants being motivated primarily by a concern
for the national interests of Iraq. The ideas expressed at these meetings were
strictly those of the participants in their individual capacities, even though
a number of them were attached to specific political groups or ideational
currents. The meetings had the important effect of facilitating the formulation of
commonly accepted parameters regarding the sectarian problem in Iraq, and the
methods that should be employed to tackle this issue in any future
restructuring of the political order in the country. This document - Declaration
of the Shia of Iraq- is the result of these discussions and deliberations.
Following the establishment of the constitutional entity that became
modern Iraq in 1923, and the organisation of its administrative and political
affairs, the sectarian paradigm became a key organising principle of the
governing powers. It then quickly evolved into a set of fixed political rules
of power and control that has continued into present times. A number of Iraq’s leading political figures were acutely aware of the
dangers of pursing a deliberate sectarian policy on the part of the state and
its deleterious effects on the country. They introduced a number of political
initiatives and programmes that were designed to highlight and reverse the
sectarian framework of governmental policies, and to counter the hardening of
official sectarian discrimination against the Shia. The most important of these
initiatives would include: -
The detailed
letter that King Faysal I addressed to his ministers in 1932, and in which he
highlighted the injustice that has been afflicted on the Shia and the critical
importance of addressing their concerns and sense of betrayal by the state. -
The letter that
was addressed to the Iraqi Government by Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Kashif
al-Ghita in which he drew attention to the discrimination that has been meted
out to the Shia and the necessity of removing its causes and manifestations. -
The initiative of
the Shia religious authorities under the guidance of the Imam Sayyid Muhsin
al-Hakim in the 1960’s that encompassed representations to the authorities on
the sectarian issue. -
The 1964 letter
of Sheikh Muhammed Ridha al-Shibibi that was addressed to the then Prime
Minister of Iraq, Abdul Rahman Al Bazzaz, and which detailed the condition of
the Shia and their grievances. All of these initiatives shared a common concern that rejected the
sectarian bases of political power and authority in Iraq, and its decidedly
anti-Shia bias. These initiatives called for the abandonment of these sectarian
policies, the granting of full political and civil rights to the Shia, and
called for their treatment within the framework of sound constitutional
principles based on a notion of citizenship that was inherently inclusive and
fair. These initiatives also provided the catalyst for subsequent activities
in the fight against sectarianism that was joined by writers, intellectuals and
the ulema, all of whom called for the dissolution of the sectarian
structures of policy-making and the confirmation of the Shia’s civil and
political rights in line with those of other groups in society. However, none of these initiatives and activities met with anything but
total rejection by the state, which continued in its sectarian biases
irrespective of the damage that this caused, and would continue to cause, to
the fabric of society and its integrity. The authorities simply ignored the
catastrophic consequences of these policies, which were to influence all Iraqis
regardless of their sectarian, ethnic or religious affiliations. The Iraqi Shia problem is now a globally recognised fault line and is no
longer restricted to the confines of Iraq’s territory. It has ceased to be a
local issue, for the international community and its organisations (such as
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Iraq)
have now acknowledged openly the existence of a serious sectarian problem in
Iraq, and have expressed their sympathy and solidarity with the plight of the
Shia of Iraq and the sectarian biases that they daily encounter from the
authorities. The sectarian issue has now emerged into the light of day in spite of
the Iraqi authorities’ attempts, through their political and media apparatuses,
to cover up its reality. The rights of the Shia are now an issue that is
central to the present and future conditions of Iraq, and must now be included
in any plan or programme that tries to tackle the reconstruction of the Iraqi
state. It is for the very reason of its criticality that a calm and reasoned
debate is now called for to discuss the rights and demands of the Shia. This declaration draws on the long line of similar efforts made in the
past by the leaders of the Shia in Iraq. It follows closely on their path of
calling, responsibly and persistently, for the legitimate rights that are due
the Shia, and in a manner that reflects properly the views of the Iraqi Shia as
a whole. This is especially relevant today where the Shia in Iraq do not have
an authoritative leadership that can tackle the issues and problems that
concern them, not least their political, cultural and civil rights.
A dictionary definition of the Shia would be those who claim a historic
loyalty to the Household of the Prophet and their school of Islam. In the
context of Iraq however, the Shii is any person who belongs to the Jaafari sect
of Islam either by birth or choice. The Shia in Iraq are not an ethnic group
nor a race nor nation, but rather, can comprise any social combination that
believes that its Shia fealty has led it to suffer from persistent sectarian
disadvantage over the centuries. The policies of discrimination against the Shia of Iraq have caused
every Shii to believe that he or she is targeted because of their Shiism and
for no other reason. The Shii is treated as a second-class citizen almost from
birth, and is deliberately distanced from any major position of authority or
responsibility. He or she suffers from an in-built preference given to others
even though others are less skilled or qualified. This sectarian pattern has been employed in Iraq over the centuries. The
Shia were frequently the objects of the retribution and oppression of the
authorities simply because of sectarian considerations, even though the
intensity and frequency of the anti-Shia activities of the authorities might
have ebbed and flowed. However, the oppression has been ratcheted up
drastically over the past twenty years. The determination of the authorities to implement these policies and
their insistence on the continuing isolation of the Shia from any meaningful
exercise of power has contributed, in the modern period, to the transformation
of the Iraqi Shia into a recognisable social entity with its own peculiarities,
far from any specific ideological and religious considerations. In other words
the crystallisation of the Shia as a distinct group owes far more to the
policies of discrimination and retribution than to any specifically sectarian
or religious considerations. This condition now defines the status of the Shia
in Iraq irrespective of the individual Shii’s doctrinal, religious or political
orientations.
The Shia’s disillusioning experience with the circumstances that
underpinned the formation of the first Iraqi government in 1920 was the
defining historical factor in their political evolution. This statement can be
amply justified by any number of impartial historical studies. The Iraqi state
was designed within clear sectarian boundaries, with the intention of
distancing the Shia and their leadership from the decision-making structures of
the nascent state. And even though the sectarian principles of power and
authority were not explicitly set out in the original basic law of the country,
they became the unwritten code for generations of politicians in both
monarchical and republican Iraq. This is painfully ironic in as much as the Shia played a pivotal role in
establishing the conditions for an independent Iraq, being the main actors in
the Iraqi Uprising of 1920. The subsequent gross diminution of the position of
the Shia in the Iraqi state cannot be reconciled in any way therefore with the
importance that their leaders had in the struggle against foreign rule. The
connivance of the foreign controlling power in the establishment of sectarian
bases of political power set the stage for the evolution of the sectarian
system that has continued to the present day.
The British occupation of Iraq was met by rejection from a united front
between the Shia and Sunni populations of Iraq. Both groups were unanimous in
refusing the occupation and insistent on the formation of a national government
free of foreign control. This unity was further strengthened by the rejection
of the two communities of all the projects and programmes advanced by the occupying
administration to reconcile them to their condition, culminating in the common
positions adopted by them in their support for the 1920 Uprising. However,
Britain succeeded in dividing the two communities when it proposed the
formation of an Iraqi government that was based on sectarian principles and
advantage, and this became the model, which was followed scrupulously by
subsequent governments. The powers that controlled the Iraqi state strove to convince the Sunnis
of Iraq that all the emblems and trappings of power, both civil and military,
were the lot of heir community by right, and that any serious Shia involvement
in the government would be at the expense of their controlling share of power.
The authorities, both in monarchical and republican Iraq, succeeded therefore
in both the weakening of any potential or real inter-sectarian solidarity as
well as in marginalizing the role of the Shia. The raising of any specifically
Shia demand for redress became the subject of vitriolic accusations of “sectarianism”
by the authorities, even though the Shia were the prime victims of the state’s
sectarianism. Patriotism and national unity became appropriated by the state as
a cover for this sectarian reality. The famous dictum of Iraq’s first prime minister, Abd el-Rahman
an-Naqib, addressed to the Shia leadership who were advocating the rejection of
the Mandate terms: “ I am the owner (governor) of this land, so what do you (the Shia) have
to do with it?” is an accurate gauge of the
political direction that Iraq was to take. The principle of rejecting serious
Shia participation in the state became the dominant recurring theme of the
governing authorities. Sunnis were to rule by their vigilant control over the
main sources of civil, military and social power, while the Shia majority were
to be marginalized and isolated. In this way, the Shia’s numerical majority in
Iraq would be overridden by the deliberate policies of sectarian preference and
discrimination, and if need be, oppression. This has been the basis of Iraq’s political life, with the state
actively waging war against the Shia’s sense of identity, self-confidence and
purpose. Violent propaganda campaigns were waged against the Shia and their
beliefs, while the state never ceased to remind the Sunnis of the Shia menace
and the threat that the Shia posed to their rights and privileges and to their
superior social and political status. The authorities never relented in their discriminatory policies against
the Shia.Each new ruler in Iraq found himself confronted with the inchoate
anger of the Shia, to which the classic response was to deflect and defuse that
threat by a further reduction of the Shia’s presence and role. This constant
increase in the level and extent of discrimination and state violence against
the Shia has made an explosion inevitable. This relentless increase of sectarian discrimination against the Shia
has culminated in the present ruling powers aggressively working towards the
elimination of any aspect of Shii public life, within a calculated plan to
destroy the institutions of the Shia and thereby weaken and eliminate their
communal underpinnings. Shia schools and institutions of higher learning, such
as the Fiqh (Jurisprudence) College in Najaf and the College of
Religious Sciences in Baghdad, were closed as was the cancellation of the
Shia-inspired and backed but broadly non-religious University of Kufa. Shia merchants and businessmen were deported
in droves, mainly to destroy the economic and commercial vitality of the Shia.
The violence perpetrated against the Shia ulema and study circles has
been unprecedented, driving the Shia specifically, and the country generally,
into an extremely dangerous crisis situation.
In spite of the fact that the Shia in Iraq subscribe to numerous
political and intellectual groupings, it is the islamist movement that has
acted as the main political drive for the Shia at the present moment. The
islamist current has been broadly connected, by political commentators and
analysts in the region and internationally, with the aspirations of the Shia as
a whole .As such, the islamist movement has been seen as reflective of the
Shia’s views and aims, and in certain respects its proxy. To some extent this
is an inappropriate attribution as the islamist parties in Iraq have an
explicitly Islamic, rather than sectarian, orientation. Moreover, the condition
of the Shia in Iraq is such that they can owe allegiances to a variety of
political and cultural currents that are not necessarily islamic in direction. The Shia’s opposition to the state in Iraq is based on political rather
than sectarian considerations and has evolved as a consequence of a prolonged
process of continuing sectarian discrimination and cruel oppression by the state.
In spite of the long-standing nature of the policies of sectarian
discrimination, Iraq has not witnessed social discrimination in terms of one
community, the Sunnis, consciously oppressing another, the Shia. The discrimination
with which the Shia have been afflicted is entirely the work of the state. This
is a vital point to ponder, as the crises with which Iraq had to contend are a
consequence of official rather than communal discrimination. Any programme that
hopes to reconstruct the terms of power in Iraq has to start from the point of
officially inspired discrimination and not mutual communal hostility. It is crucial to differentiate between legitimate sectarian differences
due to doctrinal and other factors, and a policy of officially sanctioned
sectarian advantage and discrimination. Iraq suffers from a sectarian system
and not from communal sectarianism per se. There is no overt problem between
Iraq’s sectarian communities, but rather the opposite is the case, as Iraq has
managed to accommodate, at the social level, the differences between its ethnic
and sectarian groups. A relatively high degree of harmony has prevailed between
the Sunnis and the Shia, in many ways superior to the conditions prevailing in
most multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian countries. The struggle for national
sovereignty and independence was joined equally by both the Sunnis and the
Shia, at the level of their respective leaderships and right down to the
community rank and file. Most of the national parties had a broad base of
sectarian representation, and sectarian considerations did not dominate the
response to key issues and moments that affected the destiny of the country. The Shia’s main driving forces in their struggle for national independence
and the building of the modern Iraqi state, were the rejection of foreign
hegemony over Iraq and the insistence on sovereign independence. By acceding to
the granting of the crown of Iraq to one of Sharif Hussain’s sons, Faysal, the
Shia clearly indicated their willingness to transcend purely sectarian
considerations when dealing with vital national issues, even though it could
have been possible for them to demand a Shia king, given their relative weight
in Iraq’s social and political landscape at that time. It is quite possible
that the kingship of Faysal would not have materialised if the Shia religious
and political leadership had vigorously opposed to it. Iraq’s political crisis has nothing to do with either social
discrimination or a latent Shia sense of inferiority towards the Sunnis, or
vice versa. It is entirely due to the conduct of an overtly sectarian authority
determined to pursue a policy of discrimination solely for its own interests of
control, a policy that has ultimately led to the total absence of political and
cultural liberties and the worse forms of dictatorship. It is not possible for
Iraq to emerge out of this cul-de-sac without the complete banishment of
official sectarianism from any future political construct, and its replacement
by a contract premised on a broad and patriotic definition of citizenship that
is far removed from sectarian calculations and divisions. Any policy that calls for the official adoption of the division of
powers on the basis of overt sectarian percentages- such as the situation in
Lebanon- cannot be workable in the context of Iraq, given its social and
historical experience, and will not resolve the current impasse. It is quite
probable that such a solution may well result in further problems, dilemmas and
crises being laid in store for the country. The only way out of this conundrum
is the total rejection of the anti-Shia practices of the state, and the
adoption of an inclusive and equitable system of rule that would define the
political direction of the future Iraq. This is what the Shia want and not some
bogus solution based on the division of the spoils according to demographic
formulae, a condition that would very probably result in communal sectarianism
becoming a social and political reality rather than a manifestation of an
unscrupulous state authority. The airing in public of the sectarian issues facing Iraq does not
subject Iraq’s unity to any serious threat. It is intended to confront the
problem directly, in order to correctly define its nature and to proffer
solutions that would lead to its elimination. Ignoring the problem, or sweeping
it under the carpet because of some ill-defined “threat” to national unity only
compounds the issue and is an affront to the memory of the untold multitudes that
have perished or suffered hardships and indignities because of their sectarian
identity and allegiances. There is the unavoidable reality that there are two sects in Iraq, a
fact which it would be foolish to deny or ignore. The imposition of an enforced
and artificial homogeneity on this reality only serves to compound the problem
and pushes it to the point where an explosion becomes inevitable. The
recognition and even celebration of Iraq’s sectarian diversity is an important
platform in reconstructing the terms of dialogue between the state and the
people, and by confirming the civil and religious rights of all the sects and
groups in Iraq, the ground is strengthened for enhancing the sense of unity and
patriotism in the country. The sectarian issue in Iraq will not be solved by the imposition of a
vengeful Shia sectarianism on the state and society. It can only be tackled by
defining its nature and boundaries and formulating a complete national
programme for its resolution. At the same time, the imperative of national
unity should not be used as a pretext to avoid the necessity of dismantling the
sectarian state and its harmful policies.
The distinction between the existence of
sectarian differences and sectarian discrimination as such, must be established
clearly. The state has masked its exploitation of the existence of sectarian
differences in order to pursue its policy of sectarian discrimination. The sectarian differences within Islam can be
traced to the dawn of the Islamic era. Iraq’s Muslim population is divided
between Sunnis and Shia and there should be no harm or fear about acknowledging
this fact. The sects have co-existed by and large for generations with no
serious sectarian crises resulting in consequence. Sectarian differences do not
constitute a social, intellectual or political issue in the Iraqi context, and
sectarian affiliations should be a matter of course. The real issue is official sectarianism rather
than sectarian differences. Or in other words, the exploitation of the
differences between the sects for the purpose of discriminating between them in
order to promote a specific policy of power and control. It is this deliberate
policy of enshrining sectarian differences to promote discriminatory and
retrograde policies that has been used to strip the Shia of their political and
civil rights and to reduce them to the status of second-class citizens. The
label of “Shia” has been sufficient cause to remove the ordinary Shii from any consideration
of positions of power and authority irrespective of his qualities and
competences, and in spite of his political affiliations. To be a Shia in Iraq
is to be condemned to a lifetime of powerlessness, fear, anxiety and
discrimination. The absence of any noticeable Shia
representation in the upper reaches of state and power is clearly evident and
incontrovertible, as is the manifest discrimination employed against them. The
reconstruction of Iraq’s state and society requires therefore a deep understanding
of what the Shia actually want from their state, starting from the abolition of
official discrimination and the return to them of their civil and
constitutional rights from which they have been deprived for decades. Civil and political rights must be guaranteed
through the development of a body of laws and institutions that guard against
sectarian discrimination. These should also aim to remove all traces of
sectarian practices in Iraq and would be empowered with the authority to
enforce these new policies. Sectarian loyalties that unite peoples who share a
common heritage and history are a natural occurrence and each person should be
free to declare his sectarian affinities without fear or anxiety. But this
should not result in the enshrining of sectarianism as a policy or as a basis
for political action.
The lessons drawn from Iraq’s history are clear- the Shia have at no
point sought to establish their own state or unique political entity. Rather,
whenever the opportunity was afforded to them, they participated
enthusiastically in nation-wide political movements and organisations, ever
conscious of the need to maintain national unity and probably more so than
other groups inside Iraq. This can be abundantly established by examining the
Shia’s involvement in the struggle to establish the independent Iraqi state
within its current recognised borders. The Shia, both in their islamist and
non-islamist manifestations, have avoided being dragged into separatist schemes,
and have been steadfast in their commitment to the unitary Iraqi state. The
vital support that they gave to the claims of the Sharifian candidate to the
Iraqi throne, in addition to the general sympathy that was exhibited to the
cause of the Sharifs of Mecca after the Great War, was symptomatic of their
patriotism. This historic position of the Shia in favour of the unitary
constitutional Iraqi state was not given its due measure, unfortunately, by
successive Iraqi governments. In fact, the Shia role in safeguarding the unity
of Iraq was constantly belittled and frequently ignored. The earliest political
parties and movements in which the Shia were involved, were clear in their
platforms and programmes of an absolute commitment to an independent and constitutional
state stretching from the Province of Mosul in the north to the Province of
Basra in the south. The slogan, “An Arab Islamic Government”,
that was demanded by the Shia leadership in the referendum of 1919 is the
incontrovertible evidence of the commitment of the Shia to an Arab/Muslim form
of rule for Iraq, and the rejection of any status not commensurate with full
political independence for the country. This position of the Shia remained firm in spite of their oppression and
discrimination at the hands of successive governments. The expulsion of Sheikh
Mahdi al-Khalisi to Iran by the government of Muhsin as-Saadoun, in blithe
disregard of the role that he played in securing popular approval for the
demand for national sovereignty and independence, was one of the first
manifestations of the policy of official anti-Shiism in action. But the
constant harassments and threats that the Shia leadership were subjected to in
the early days of independence did not deflect them from their commitment to the
Iraqi state. Even as we are in the midst of the present explosive situation, where
state anti-Shiism has reached unprecedented levels of violence, the Shia have
not raised the banner of withdrawal from the body politic of Iraq. The
insistence on national unity as a clear starting principle has been the common
denominator for all the active Iraqi Shia oppositionists, as has been the
recognition that the problems arising from the atrocious misgovernment of the
multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian state that is Iraq, could best be resolved in
the context of a single Iraqi state. The Shia of Iraq, in spite of being constantly and maliciously tested as
to the depth of their national loyalty, have proven, time and again, their
commitment to Iraq even at the expense of their own sectarian interests. Their
call for the restitution of their civil and political rights can in no way be
seen as a threat to national unity, when they have indisputably proven that
they have been its principal protectors in word and in deed.
The demands of the Shia can be succinctly summarised as follows:
The Declaration of the Shia of Iraq aims to
elaborate on a Shia perspective on the political future of Iraq .Its principal
points are as follows:
Firstly, Democracy: Dictatorship has been one of the main factors that have buttressed the
structures of official sectarian and ethnic discrimination, and constitutional
democracy, operating through vital and effective institutions, is the necessary
cure for this virulent ailment. The Shia do not want to solve their sectarian
problems by creating an analogous one for other groups. Rather, they are
seeking redress through a system that would guard the rights of all the
constituent elements of Iraq’s society, whereby all will be treated on an equal
footing. Secondly: Federalism One of the key elements of the Iraqi conundrum is the near exclusive
concentration of powers in the capital, Baghdad, in a manner that has robbed
the outlying regions of any opportunity to address their local concerns, needs
and special conditions and particularities. The solution has to be in the
devolution of powers and authorities to these areas within a framework of broad
administrative decentralisation. Federalism as a system would be designed to negotiate between the need
to have a central authority with effective but not hegemonic powers, and
regions that enjoy a high order of decentralised powers, all within a framework
of careful delineation of rights and responsibilities as between the centre and
the regions. Ideally, a federal system would also legislate for the maintenance
of Iraq’s unitary nature, but recognises the need to fully accommodate Iraq’s
diversity. Iraq’s federal structure would not be based on a sectarian division but
rather on administrative and demographic criteria. This would avoid the
formation of sectarian-based entities that could be the prelude for partition
or separation. The proposed federal system would grant considerable powers to the
regions, including legislative, fiscal, judicial and executive powers, thereby
removing the possibility of the centre falling under the control of a dominant
group which would extend its hegemony over the entire country. Iraq’s
federalist structures would benefit greatly from the experience of countries
that have adopted this system of government successfully. Thirdly: Abolition of the policies of sectarianism The Declaration of the Shia of Iraq envisages the
elimination of official sectarianism through the adoption of specific political
and civil rights that would eliminate the disadvantage of the Shia. A/ Political Rights: In order to eliminate the accumulation of sectarian policies and codes
of conduct employed by the authorities over decades, it would be necessary to
examine the administrative structures of the Iraqi state and its civil and
military institutions. In particular, the employment and promotion policies
that have been pursued in the past must be remedied by policies that stress
merit, effectiveness and competence as the basis for all employment. A federal
authority with a remit to combat sectarianism would be established, which would
examine closely the principles employed for filling all senior governmental
posts, and which would be charged also with adjudicating all complaints and
cases of sectarianism. The federal authority’s mandate could be extended to
include the combat of all forms of sectarianism in official and private institutions. A fund would be established to compensate all those who have been harmed
as a result of sectarian and ethnic discrimination and policies. Such a fund
would be administered by a council that would establish the norms and
procedures for evaluating the extent of damages and the restitution due. A set of laws would be introduced to abolish sectarianism and that would
criminalize sectarian conduct. A new nationality law would be introduced that would be based on a
notion of citizenship that would emphasise loyalty to Iraq rather than to any
sectarian, national or religious affiliation. B/ Civil Rights: The key civil rights that have a special resonance for the Shia would
include:
13 Repatriation of all Iraqis who were forcibly expelled from Iraq, or who felt obliged to leave under duress, and the full restitution of their constitutional and civil rights. Conclusion It is essential that all the elements of Iraq’s political spectrum, as
well as the representatives of Iraq’s varied communities, become involved in
the process of finding a way out of the terrible situation that Iraq finds
itself in now and which threaten its very survival. All these groups must
participate in the process of change and the design of a new Iraqi state so
that all have a stake in the outcome and could feel themselves true and equal
partners in the country. The Iraqi crisis has to be tackled at all its levels-political, through
the elimination of dictatorship; sectarian, through the abolition of sectarian
discrimination; and ethnic, through the elimination of ethnic and national
preference. Furthermore, it would be necessary to consider policies and programmes
that would provide redress to the many aggrieved groups in the country, and to
establish a vision of Iraq’s future in which all would share. Any shortfall
from this objective by adopting one perspective over another on the grounds of
a gradualism that postpones the tackling of these issues to some indeterminate
date in the future, is a recipe for further suffering and possibly
disaster. Constitutional guarantees and rights must be afforded to all of Iraq’s
groups and communities, as well as the means to defend or enforce them. This
must be the minimum requirement for rebuilding the Iraqi state on a new basis.
The order of priorities in this declaration have been ranked in a methodical
manner, and the sequential adoption of the policies that underpin needed change
are based on the principle of their voluntary adoption through information
dissemination and persuasion rather than their imposition by force or fiat. The adoption of the constituent components of Iraq’s society of the
elements of this declaration is important, not least for the reason that each
should feel that they have accepted the main sources of grievance and redress
of the other groups, and that they have all participated equally in the
fashioning of a new Iraqi order. Annex 1 The following are the main studies and works that have tackled the Iraqi
Shia problem.
Annex 2 A partial list of signatories to the document follows: Abdul Karim, Hayfaa (Mrs.) The
Continuous Picket, London Abdul Mahdi, Adil Researcher,
Writer, France Abdul Razzaq, Salah University
Lecturer, Netherlands Abu Qlaam, Khalil Mohammed Hussein Businessman
Abu Qlaam, Hadi Bank
Manager Abu Tebeekh, Abbas (Dr.) University
Lecturer, USA Ahmed, Nesh’at Islamic
Union of Iraqi Turkumen Al Addad, Ali (Dr.) Consultant
to NGOs, Geneva Al Adnani, Mohammed Sadiq (Professor) University
Professor in Medicine and Poet Al Adwan, Ritha Medical
Analysis CA Al Ali, Abdul Razzaq Organisation
of Faily Kurds Al Ammar, Ali (Dr.) Consultant
in Medicine, CA Al Aryan, Ali Ex
Political Prisoner, Human Rights Activist Al Askarl, Sami Islamic
Daw’a Party Al Attar, Mohammed Falah ( Shiekh) Orator
and Rhetorician( Islamic Media Center, CA Al Atiya, Firial (Mrs.) Activist
on Women Issues Al Atiya, Jihad Businessman Al Atiya, Malallah (Sheikh) Supervisor,
Imam Ali Islamic Centre, Cardiff Al Awad, Talib Politician Al Badran, Mohammed Human
Rights Activist, Nashfield, Tennessee Al Badran, Ramadhan, Human
Rights Activist, CA Al Basri, Abdul Aziz Lecturer
in Arabic Language and Literature Al Basri, Kamal (Dr.) Economist Al Basri, Khairallah (Sheikh) Scholar
of Religion Al Bassam, Mehdi Salih (Dr.) Cardiologist,
USA Al Bustani, Abbas (Dr.) University
Lecturer, Researcher, Publisher Al Bayati, Walid Saeed (Dr.) Writer,
Researcher in Islamic & Arabic Civilisation Al Chalabi, Hassan, Professor University
Chancellor & Professor of Law, Lebanon Al Dalli, Hadi (Dr.) Veterinary
Al Eshayqir, Ibrahim (Dr.) Physician Al Fadhil, Munthir (Dr.) Visiting
Associate Professor
at the College of Law ICIS Al Haeiri, Jawad Writer Al Hakkak, Hassan (Dr.) University
Lecturer Al Hakim, Abdul Hadi (Dr.) University
Lecturer, Academic Researcher Al Hakim, Sahib (Dr.) Rapporteur
on Human Rights in Iraq Al Hakim, Salih Religious
Scholar, Denmark Al Hassan, Khalid, Businessman Al Hasani, Ali (Dr.) Islamic
Thinker, Writer Al Hasani, Saleem (Dr.) Writer
and Journalist Al Hashimi, Mahmood (Dr.) Consultant
Ophthalmologist Al Hebib, Hussein Artist,
Writer Al Hilali, Mahir Mohammed Ali (Dr.) Consultant
in Haematology & Oncology Al Hillo, Muthar (Syed) Islamic
Researcher Al Hussieni, Abbas (Dr.) University
lecturer, Westminister University Al Hussieni, Ali (Dr.) Consultant
Physician Al Hussieni, Bassam Engineer,
Iraqi Community, CA Al Hussieni, Riadh Iraqi
Media Al Hussieni, Hisham (Sheikh) Supervisor,
Karbala, Islamic Centre, USA Al Ibadi, Imad Engineer,
Activist on Social Issues Al Idi, Hassan (Dr.) University
Lecturer Al Imara, Ghani Nassir Tribal
Chief Al Jaddoe’e, Abbas Hatem (Dr.) Dental
Surgery Al Jubori, Najat Hussien (Mrs.) Teacher Al Kadhimi, Mustafa Writer Al Khairallah, Jeleel Iraqi
Islamic Cadres ِAl Khelili, Ibtisam, ( Mrs.) European
Women Union Al Kheteeb, Fadhil (Sheikh) Orator
and Rhetorician Al Kheteeb, Hussien Human
Rights Activist, Netherlands Al Kheteeb, ِِAbdul Majeed
(Dr.) Consultant
Paediatrician Al Khateeb, Muhie Al Deen Diplomat Al Kheteeb, Salah (Dr.) Islamic Organisation of Human
Rights, Geneva Al Khirsan, Abdul Ameer (Dr.) Ph.D.,
adviser on Travel and Tourism Al Kilidar, Adnan (Dr.) Dental
Practitioner Al Kishmiri, Mohammed Baqir ( Sayed) Orator and Rhetorician Al Mahmood, Qasim (Dr.) University Lecturer Al Mehdawi, Ali (Dr.) University
Lecturer Al Merzuq, Qais (Dr.) Communication
Engineer CA Al Manshed, Takleef Mohammed Al
Fodhool and Aal Ghizzi Tribes Al Mize’l, Talib Harbi Bani
Rikkab Tribes Al Mizeil, Ismael Harbi Bani
Rikkab Tribes Al Mueeny, Salah Alattar Poet Al Musawi, Abbass Kereem Nie’ma (Colonel)
Pharmacist, 1991 Uprising Committee Al Musawi, Abdul Hussein Ubaies(Colonel) Figure
1991 March Uprising Al Musawi, Jawad Kadhum Businessman Al Musawi, Isra’a Abbas (Ms.) Management,
CA Al Musawi, Mohammed (Syed) Secretary General of World
Ahlul Bayt Islamic League Al Musawi, Mustafa Zaidan Iraqi
Islamic Accord Al Musawi, Sabria Mahdi(Mrs.) Human
rights Activist Al Musawi, Zahra’a Niema (Mrs.) Society
Activist Al Qizwini, Baha’a (Dr.) Ph.D.
Bio statistics Al Qizwini, Ibtihal (Dr.) Mrs. Physician Al Rezeen, Abdul Rahman Lawyer Al Rikabi, A’adil Khidhir A’al Fashakh Politics
Activist, Washington, Seattle Al Rikabi, Hussein Anbar (Dr.) Consultant
in Medicine Al Rikabi, Hussein Politician Al Rikabi, Fatima (Mrs.) Teacher Al Risan, Jawad Kadhum Chief,
Hatcham Tribe, living in Holland Al Rubaei, Abdul Kereem Journalist,
USA Al Rubaei, Adnan Abdul Ameer Engineer,
Businessman Al Rubaei, Ahmed Management
and Economy College CA Al Rubaie, Ameer Jabir (Dr.) Ph.D.
University Lecturer, Netherlands Al Rubaie, Mowaffak (Dr.) Neurologist Al Sa’yadi, Hassan Hadi (Dr.) University
Lecturer Al Sabah, Adul Ameer Ubaies Major
General, Diplomat Al Sabe’e, Taha (Dr.) University
Lecturer in Economics CA Al Sadin, Ameen (Dr.) Consultant
Physician Al Sadr, Ali Hussein Engineer Al Sadr, Mohammed (Dr.) Iraqi
Democratic Platform, Ireland Al Salihi, Mohammed Management
and Economics College CA Al Sari, Majid Writer,
Sweden Al Sedaidi, Kholood (Dr.) Mrs. Dental
Practitioner Al Sehel, Hazim Baqir Member
of Bani Timim Tribe, living
in Holland Al Sehel, Sefeya Sheikh Talib Mrs. Independent politician Al Sehlani, Fadhil (Sheikh) Spokesman
for Muslim Scholars in USA Al Shabender, Ghalib Philosopher
and Writer, Malmo, Sweden Al Shaboot, Muhsin (Dr.) Politician Al Shabut, Nebeel (Dr.) Consultant
Surgeon Al Shabut, Neda (Dr.) University
Lecturer Al Shabut, Nedeem Muhsin Computer
Engineer Al Shar’a Abdul Muneim Salih Engineer,
CA Al Shar’a, Azher Sachet Contractor
CA Al Shar’a, Hassan Ibrahim, Businessman Al Shar’a Hayder Businessman
CA Al Shar’a Sachet Sayed Isssa Leader
in 1991 Uprising Al Sharr’a Salih Sayed Mohammed Tribes
Chief, 1991 Uprising Middle Euphrates, Al Shar’a Sami, Contractor
CA Al Shami, Hussein (Syed) Dar
Al Islam Foundation Supervisor Al Shatree, Aqeel Electric
Engineer CA Al Shehristani, Hussein Nuclear
Scientist Al Shekerchi, Dhia’a (Sheikh) General
Secretary of Darul Huda. Hamburg Al Shethir, Nasir (Dr.) Former
Judge Al Shibib, Hashim Diplomat,
Politician Al Shibibi, Arwa Mohammed Ridha (Mrs.) Poet,
Writer Al Shibibi, Hala Sadiq (Ms.) Journalist Al Shibibi, Sadiq Baqir Lawyer Al Shimmeri, Mohammed Businessman
Al Swaij, Mohammed Zeki ( Syed) Supervisor, Islamic
Propagation Foundation, USA Al Tabatabei, Makki Hussein(Dr.) Consultant
Paediatrician Al Tae’e, Aziz Chief,
American Iraqi Council, Philadelphia Al Timimi, Imad Muhammed Businessman
CA Al Timimi, Sabah (Dr.) Physician Al Tuiraihi, Mohamed Saeid Historian,
Researcher, Al Turaihi, Mohammed Jawad (Sheikh) Former
Judge Al Turaihi, Muneer (Sheikh) Scholar
of Religion Al Uzri, Abdul Kereem Writer,
Former Cabinet Minister Al Zubaidi, Nejim Former
Brigadier, Republican Guards Al Yasiri, Tawfeeq (Major General) Iraqi
National Accord Alatiya, Jeleel (Dr.) Historian,
Writer, living in France Alhakim, Bayan (Dr.) Interfaith
International (UN), Geneva Alhillo, A’mir ( Syed) Head, Ahlul
Bayt Islamic Centre, Vienna Ali, Faiq Sheikh Lawyer,
Writer Allawi, Ali (Dr) Businessman,
SAM, Oxford University Allawi, Ja’afer (Dr.) Consultant
in Endocrinology Allawi, Ne’am (Mrs.) World
Wide Welfare Organisation Allawi, Sabah Hashim Former
Ambassador with the United Nations Allawi, Tawfeeq Businessman Alwash, Azzam (Dr.) PhD,
Iraqi Forum For Democracy, USA Bahroolom, Mohammed Zeki (Syed) Islamic
Scholar Bhaya, Musa(Dr.) Dental
Surgeon USA Bilal, Salah Aal (Sheikh) Religious
Scholar Bilal, Usama (Dr.) Consultant
Psychiatrist Derweesh, Aliya (Dr.) University Lecturer in Engineering CA Derweesh, Faruq (Dr.) University Lecturer CA Eshaiker,
Muhannad Architect, Iraqi Forum for
Democracy Ewadh, A’adil (Dr.) Physician,
Nebraska Fliaeh, Salam Car
Merchant CA Hannon, Mohammed Shannan Human
Rights Activist, Washington DC Hashim, Ali MSc.
Businessman, USA Hussein, Ibrahim Mohammed (Dr.) Politician Hussein, Nawal Sheikh (Mrs.) Activist
on Women Issues Huwedi, Abdul Ameer (Dr.) Scholar
of Religion Ibrahim, Khalid Front
Line Organisation, Ireland Jabr, Sa’ad Salih Head,
Free Iraqi Council Kashif Alghita, Abdul Raheem Politician,
Switzerland Kashif Alghita’a, Fadhil Abbas (Dr.) Consultant
Physician Mahdi, Manal, ( Ms.) Engineer,
USA Maksud, Ghalib Consultant
in Law, USA Maso’od, Hassan ( Sheikh) Secretary
General Ahlul Bayt Association, Glasgow Meshkoor, Fekhree (Dr.) Consultant
Physician ٍMustafa, Abdul Rahman Merchant,
San Diego Shnyien, Naif ( Dr.) Accident
and Emergency Shubber, Kadhum Syed Qasim Businessman,
Spain Shubber, Kadum Jawad (Professor) University
Lecturer: Management &Finance Simsim, Radhi Politician,
San Francisco Tu’ma Mohammed Businessman,
Nebraska Witwit, Ja’afer One
of the Leaders of the 1991 Uprising Witwit, Qaisar Activist
in the Iraqi Opposition Witwit, Zaid One
of the leaders
of 1991 Uprising, living in Holland Yousif, Maha (Dr.) Dental
Surgeon USA Yousif, Mazin (Dr.) PhD,
Medicine Yousif, Mayyada (Dr.) Physician
USA Zaini, Mohammed Ali (Dr.) Economist Annex
3
The following are extracts drawn from letters by leading Scholars and Jurisprudents, commenting on and supporting the Declaration of the Shia of Iraq. Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhim al-Haeri
“ I have received your letters regarding the extent of the effort needed to retrieve the rights of Iraq’s Shia, and my reply follows… Firstly: The rights of the Shia have been violated for a long time and up to our period today. This has been caused not by our Sunni brothers but as a result of tyrannical governments. We do not ask the minority sect in Iraq, the Sunnis, to grant rights to the Shia, the majority, for the scholars of Islam have all agreed that Islam does not differentiate between the rights of Muslims, irrespective of their sects. Each member of a sect recognises and respects the particularities of its own sect, and we as followers of the Household of the Prophet recognise the limits of our sect and respect them. Secondly: We demand that all tyrannical governments in Iraq cease from trampling the rights of the majority Shia; as we demand from them also that they cease to trample the rights of the minority Sunnis .We say to these governments; We are all Muslims and we enjoy equality of rights under the mantle of Islam. Thirdly: It is essential that the rights of national minorities such as our brothers the Kurds and Turcomen and others be respected in parallel to the respect of the rights of the Arabs. This is an issue that has no bearing on the issue of sectarian discrimination. And from this perspective, the division of the Iraqi nation into Kurds, Shia and Sunnis is not accurate and mixes between the ethnic issue and the sectarian issue. It would appear to us that this is a deliberate ploy on the part of the international hegemonistic powers. Fourthly: We demand from any non-Islamic government in Iraq to relinquish power and to allow the Iraqi nation to choose for itself the type of government it wants, which we are sure is an Islamic government.” His Eminence Sayyid Murtadha al-Askari, Dean, College
of the Principles of Religion “ Recognising what the Shia of the Household of the Prophet have achieved in Iraq, we affirm the following: Firstly; That the Shia of the Household of the Prophet are the majority of Iraq’s population. Secondly: They struggled, under the guidance of their scholars, for the independence of Iraq. Thirdly: Following the Second World War they confronted, culturally, the spread of communism .The treacherous Baath party that is in control of Iraq has murdered their scholars including the leading luminaries the martyrs Sayyid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, Sayyid Muhammed al-Sadr, and the lady martyr Bint-ul-Huda.” His Eminence Sayyid Muhammed Bahr-ul-Uloom
“… And the Iraqi Shia, being the majority in the country, have been the regular victims of these regimes, for whenever dictatorship increased in intensity, it was accompanied with an equal intensification of sectarian discrimination. The Saddamist dictatorship pushed further the limits of sectarianism by marginalizing the Shia religious authorities, and the liquidation of Shia scholars and notables and the destruction of their holy shrines and study circles. This was particularly 1991evidenced by the dictatorship raising the slogan of “ No more Shia as of today!” following the popular uprising. We believe that the struggle against the dictatorship must continue to remove tyranny and to replace it with the democratic alternative, and to remove political sectarianism. This will return to the Shia of Iraq their main role in rebuilding the state and realising the hopes of the people. … And we must encourage all perspectives and objective analyses that are based on the recognition of the multiple particularities and identity of Iraq. We support vigorously all efforts that lead to the elaboration of a national programme that is commensurate with our people’s desire to build a civil society and a country that is based on law, in which the rights of the | ||
