The American administration's invitation of six leaders of the Iraqi opposition to meet in Washington this month represents a positive step that can lead to a qualitative shift in the relationship between America and the opposition, on the one hand, and a future Iraq in the post-Saddam era, on the other. The six invited leaders are Baqir al-Hakim (head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq - SCIRI), Masoud Barzani (head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party), Jalal Talabani (head of the Kurdistan Patriotic Union), Ayyad Allawi (general secretary of the National Harmony Movement), Ahmed Chalabi (of the Iraqi National Congress), and Ali Bin-Hussein (of the Constitutional Monarchy Movement).

The importance of the invitation lies in it being issued by the two competing parties in the American administration: the Department of State and the Department of Defense. That is because their competition has reflected negatively on the Iraqi opposition groups and it has made them just cards to be played in the struggle between the two departments and increased their division.

The fact is that the American Defense and State Departments have agreed to such a step without the other staffs in the administration (the White House, the National Security Council, the Office of the Vice President, and the CIA) having the joint conviction to do so. The invitation is in the name of State and Defense.

When the American policy toward Iraq was one of containment, Washington dealt with the opposition as just a media facade and sometimes as a tool for the CIA. It prevented it from having any role in any serious process of change inside Iraq. The 1996 abortive attempt at armed resistance to the regime in Kurdistan is an example of this policy.

Despite the Bush Administration's approval of a decision for change after the events of 11 September, it has not yet reached any common consensus with respect to how to deal with the opposition groups. The competition has continued between the various wings of the administration at the expense of the opposition's unity. The Department of Defense and the Iraqi elements loyal to it worked hard to thwart the State Department's efforts to convene a series of meetings that were dedicated to studying the options for a future Iraq. These meetings were to end in a comprehensive political conference. In return, the Department of State foiled the Iraqi National Congress (INC) from convening a conference of military officials in Washington by abstaining from financing this conference. The conference of Iraqi military officials that was held in London recently was just a response to that.

The United States has enjoyed a lot of harmony and good will from the Iraqi powers that are opposed to the dictatorship. This is something that was reflected in the Salah-al-Din meeting of 1992 that brought forth the Iraqi National Congress with the participation of the Iraqi opposition groups from the far left (the Communist Party) through the Arab and Kurdish nationalist powers along with the liberals and ending with the Islamic parties (including the Da'wah Party).

However, the American policy of containment and the ensuing struggle between the various wings quickly led to the stores of good will being used up. The INC broke up to become just a political party after it had been an umbrella group for everyone.

To a large extent, the American way of treating the opposition groups would reflect on the identity of a new Iraq. The American administration had two options. The first was to go it alone in deciding the future of the country without coordinating with the opposition groups (under the pretext that they were divided) and occupying Iraq, relying solely on American forces. Consequently, they would impose a new regime along the lines of what happened in Germany and Japan after their defeat in the Second World War.

The second option was for America to play a supporting role in unifying the political forces that were opposed to the dictatorship in such a way as to bring about a unified political leadership or front that would be committed to a previously arranged political program. In this case, America's role would be closer to that of a surgeon who is removing a tumor while protecting the body.

After ten years of political division and wasted time, it became difficult to repeat the Salah-al-Din experience of 1992 by immediately convening an expanded conference that everyone would participate in. It might be better to start with a nucleus represented by the group of six that is being invited to meet in Washington. The ripples spreading out from this meeting might result in an expanded conference that yields a unified political leadership with a carefully studied and agreed-upon program of action.

By inviting the six, the American administration has thrown the ball into the Iraqi opposition's court. It makes any non-attendance or reduction in the level of representation a source of weakness among these parties. Consequently, America is exempt from much of the responsibility and criticism. The participation of some of those invited to this conference brings with it a lot of responsibility and even risk, especially with respect to the Kurdish and regional parties. Perhaps they would prefer it if the invitation and the meeting were farther away from the media and the limelight.

The coming days just before the meeting will require preparation and contacts between these parties and the administration. This is so that they will be assured of the seriousness of the American position. But the fear of failure will not be eliminated by the seriousness of the American position alone. Rather, it will also depend upon the willingness of the Iraqi parties to get beyond their personal differences and rise to the level of taking responsibility.

The option posed before the Kurdish and Islamic parties is as follows: America will provide the change in regime in Iraq even though this will require military devastation. So will they want to be a party to this, which will enable them to have an influence on the type of alternative regime in Iraq? Or will they prefer to stay on the hill, fearing that criticism and pressures from the other parties will not give them a role after the regime in Iraq has been changed?

Convening the meeting of six at this time and place (and at the proposed representational level) would send a signal that the United States has chosen to give the Iraqi opposition an active role in changing the regime. This would be sufficient to reassure many of the Iraqi, Arab, and regional parties that the US will not go it alone.

If America has been the "Great Satan" to some of the Islamic movements, then the greatest self-delusion is to reject the dialogue with it. The Vietnamese, the Algerians, and Palestinians have all had dialogues with the powers occupying their lands. So how is it with the Iraqis, who are in the most pressing need for a friend? Are those who demand that Baqir al-Hakim reject such a dialogue offering an alternative that is serving the Iraqi people with bread instead of hunger? Life instead of martyrdom? Freedom instead of exile and permanent opposition?

The bridge that Al-Hakim can prepare in his dialogue with the US (by delegating a representative from SCIRI to Washington-especially after 11 September) can serve many of the five million Muslims in America in addition to the Iraqis. Of even more help, it would put a check on the feelings of suspicion and rancor between the Muslims and the West. The greatness of the commander lies in the greatness of his cause. Is there any cause greater for a Muslim than the protection of Muslims? But Tehran's call (in Al-Hakim's name) to the Arab elements among the group of six to visit Iran prior to heading off to Washington is (in the best estimation) an attempt to get into line with America at the expense of the Iraqi delegation's friendship that will bring about harm to the regime change process.

The Kurdish leaderships, which bear the responsibility for more than four million citizens, have a right to make sure that the coming steps will not bring harm to the Kurdish people. In addition to the need to make sure they are not sacrificed, as was the case in 1991, they have the right to determine their own fate within the new Iraq. If there is a preference for maintaining the Kurdish status quo that is attributable to American protection, then Washington is the one that is most able to help the Kurds arrive at a format for coexistence within the new Iraq without sacrificing them to the interests of Turkey or the central government in Baghdad. The recent settlement of the South Sudan issue through the mediation of the United States reinforces the possibility of reaching a settlement without abandoning the rights of the Kurds.

The group of six meeting may inaugurate the principle of Iraqi-American partnership. This requires the complete unity of the Iraqi opposition's position just like the Iraqis must demand unity from the American position.

The Difficult Tasks of the Meeting of Six

The legitimacy of "the six" for representing the Iraqis does not come from Washington. Rather, it lies in their ability to open up to the others and create a mechanism that is suitable for them to make and approve decisions, especially with respect to the issues of basic disagreement. The first round of Washington meetings must set the political agenda for these meetings.

In addition to the procedural aspect of expanding the participation to include others, there is also the objective aspect of defining the relationship with the United States and the role of the Iraqis in the coming change. Another aspect is the Iraqi environmental relationship and remedying the issues of disagreement so that a political charter is established and an expanded conference can yield a unified political leadership.

The success of those meeting in the honest repudiation and remedying of these issues of disagreement would be a great accomplishment that would facilitate the process of regime change. It would prevent disputes from arising and the shedding of blood. The future of Iraqi Kurdistan, the issue of Kirkuk, the rights of the Turkmen and Assyrians, the issue of sectarianism, and the future of the existing regime's institutions (especially the army) during the transitional phase are among the most prominent of these contentious issues.

Throughout the past century, the Iraqis failed to find solutions to these contentious issues. I do not believe that they can resolve them without outside help. This is where the role of the United States comes in to help and provide assurance and commitment and implement any conciliatory format. The participants might reach the point where it is necessary for the United Nations to supervise over what has been agreed upon.

As for putting off a discussion of these matters under the pretext of toppling Saddam first, it practically sows a future minefield that might spoil the experiment and reflect negatively on both the Iraqis and the United States.

Naturally, it is not the right of the "group of six" to decide these things without the participation of the other relevant parties. The issue of the Turkmen cannot be decided without their participation, as is the case with the Assyrians. The sectarianism issue cannot be decided without the representation of the Sunni party, which deserves consideration. The same is true for the military officers and the other political, social, and laudable forces.

The Iraqis' arrival at a joint, conciliatory format (under international assurance) can go a long way toward dissipating regional fears. It can open the door wide for the cooperation of the neighboring states in this regime change or, at least, not have them take a stand against it.

After decades of wasted time and fragmentation, the Iraqi opposition has an opportunity to regain the trust that it has lost in Iraq and the Arab World. Will it succeed in doing so?