Reports

Smart Sanctions: Restructuring UN Policy in Iraq
(April 25, 2001)

Dr. Tariq Ali Al-Saleh

No two people would disagree with the statement that Iraq is not Afghanistan and that Saddam is not Mullah Omar. This is what was affirmed by US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and repeatedly referred to in the world's media after the events 11th September. This was also the title of an article written by Major General Wafiq Al-Samarai, published in the London-based Saudi newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsatt in its 25th December 2001 edition.

What has been affirmed is plain and true, but I disagree with Al-Samarai with respect to the precision of his analysis of this fact. I shall present my disagreement from the point of the nature of the two regimes, and secondly from the point of the strategic importance of the two countries.

I The Nature of the Two Regimes. It is no secret that there are many significant differences between the two regimes. However we shall here only compare the extent of their strength and their solidity in the face of an attack by armed forces supported by the US, as happened in Afghanistan. Al-Samarai thinks that the elements that make Saddam's regime superior to the Taliban's are its economic power, the number of men under arms, totalling 400,000, and the quantity of weapons totalling 5,000 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, half of which are probably out of service, including the remnants of chemical and biological weapons. In addition to all this are the security and intelligence organs, propelled by the material benefits that Saddam bestows upon its commanders. Al-Samarai gave particular importance to the emergency procedures that Saddam might resort to, thus strengthening the already existing elements of power, such as using the Iraqi people as human shields, and arresting activists whose loyalty to the regime is doubtful.

However, the emergency procedures mentioned by Al-Samarai that Saddam's regime continuously resorts to, are elements of weakness rather than elements of strength. This is particularly so during conditions of armed revolution, as emergency procedures will create the people's and the armed forces hostility to the regime and will create unforeseen reactions. Such procedures are directed against the State and its bases totally. Although the figures presented by Al-Samarai in his article about weapons and number of soldiers are true, he has ignored, however, the most important elements of superiority of the Taliban regime as they were supported by Al-Qaidah, as can be summarised as follows:

A. The Taliban regime relied on fanaticism recruited naive people to defend the regime, who were Al-Qaidah members who were ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the regime. However Saddam's regime depends on opportunists and mercenaries who will not hesitate to abandon it once their lives and their interest are endangered.

B. The Taliban regime enjoyed the support of the Pishtoun tribes, who represent 60% of the Afghan people, while Saddam's regime lacks even the support of Al-Oujah village (Saddam birth place) as his family suffers from conflict and bloody feuds.

C. The very difficult terrain in Afghanistan is much more formidable to attacking forces than Saddam's weapons.

The lack of any cause or conviction in a cause will defeat any army however mighty it may be. History is full of such examples, particularly the Gulf War when the Iraqi Armed Forces were defeated thoroughly and astonishingly speedily. The reason for this was the lack of any cause the Iraqi soldier could hold on to during the conflict, and the disastrous collapse of morale. This was so despite the huge Iraqi military build-up detailed in Al-Samarai,s book entitled (in Arabic) "Huttam Al-Bawabah Al-Sharqiah" (p 292):

- More than one million soldiers;
- More than 13,000 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, including 2000 T-72 modern soviet built tanks;
- About 640 combat aircraft including Mig 25 and 29, Mirage F1, Su 25, and TU-22;
- Huge stores of ammunition and a large number of military factories;
- Large amounts of chemical and biological weapons;
- A surface-to-surface missile force, including missiles with chemical and biological heads.

Al-Samarai, in his book, states that pre-Gulf War Iraqi armed forces were outside Arab capabilities, and superior to Turkish and Iranian capabilities, to the extent that the Iraqi armed forces would have been able to sweep southwards and occupy the oilfields reaching Hormouz within two weeks, provided no western forces intervened. However once the Iraqi forces, despite their huge armoury, collapsed, the American commander, General Shwartzkopf, claimed that, had he been given an extra twenty-four hours Shwartzkopt, claimed that, had he been given an extra twenty-four hours regime.

From the above we can conclude that indeed Saddam is not Mullah Omar, not because Saddam is stronger than Mullah Omar, but because he is actually weaker, to the extent that if Saddam was in Afghanistan he would not have lasted a single day, not because of US support for the forces of the Afghani opposition, but because of not having the elements of the necessary forces, including the strategic position which we will come to below.

If Saddam,s regime was defeated, despite its huge armoury, what would its fate be now, having lost, according to Al-Samarai himself, 80% of that armoury? Furthermore, the value of the Iraqi Dinar has collapsed. Prior to the invasion of Kuwait the exchange rate was between four and five Dinars to the dollar, while now the exchange rate is about 2,000 Dinars to the dollar. It seems to me that the analysis of my colleague, Al-Samarai, contradicts his previous position, particularly at the time of leaving Iraq at the end of 1994, then leading a short military campaign from northern Iraq during March 1995 in collaboration with the Iraqi National Congress and some Kurdish parties, using no more than light weapons with the aim of overthrowing Saddam,s regime. In a radio interview he promosed the listeners that he would crush Saddam,s regime within three months, adding that large numbers of officers and soldiers began to defect to his forces. In this he was right, but due to the lack of US support for that operation, in addition to the continuing disagreement among the main Kurdish parties that operation failed abjectly.

Al-Samarai in his book (p 344) affirms a truth with which I agree, when he says: "How can anyone believe that the Iraqi people and the armed forces will fight in defence of Saddam, once we give them an undertaking about their safety?" I.e. if the massage was clear enough that it is Saddamwho is sought, even without such a message nobody fought, with the exception of a very few in their own self-defence and who probably would have more likely preferred to surrender. Thus I believe that Iraq is not a banana republic, but rather like a meringue, which is quite large in appearance yet very quickly melts in the mouth.

II Strategic Importance: This is the issue where there are regional and international disagreements. It is the very reason why Saddam,s regime has continued, and which is used by Saddam,s regime as a cover and a bargaining chip. Iraq has a more important strategic position than Afghanistan and has crucial natural resources namely oil and gas, while Afghanistan does not. Iraq is considered a security strategic depth for the Gulf States, thus it is a regional counter-balance in the area. Thus, any disturbance in this equilibrium will have far reaching adverse consequences on the economy, security and peace of the region and the world. That is why any uprising or popular revolution against Saddam's regime, similar to what happened during March 1991, will disturb such a balance.

However the question is, does not Saddam regime itself constitute a threat to this regional balance, particularly as the regime proved his willingness to violate rules of international law, disregard international agreements and treaties, manifested by launching wars on neighbours, committing war crimes, using against his own people chemical weapons that are banned in war, its blatant denial of human rights, its use of terror and savage suppression as a mean of holding on to power? Saddam is still watching and waiting for opportunities to create tension and disturbances in the area and the world at large.

The answer to this question is tied up with two chief reasons:

1. The Turkish position: The Turks see that any change through an uprising with or without US support will give the Kurds a big opportunity to build an independent country, which is absolutely opposed by the Turks. That is why the Turks are against any change in Iraq that comes through an uprising. I think that this position is exaggerated, because the Kurds, despite their legitimate right of self-determination, have been taught by experience to be aware of the necessity of accepting international conditions, which do not allow the creation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. In addition Iraqi Kurds do not seek separation from Iraq on their own, in fear of being swallowed up by neighbouring countries, particularly as the basis of their revolution is Iraq, which has historically given the Kurds far superior rights than other Kurds enjoy in neighbouring countries.

2. The Gulf States position: No doubt Gulf states are the only ones among Iraqi's neighbours that have no designs on Iraqi,s territory and wealth. The only cause for concern for the Gulf states is that Iraq represents its security depth, thus any shake-up in its make-up adversely might reflect their security. Unfortunately, the events of the March 1991 were accompanied by political slogans that have left negative impression in the memory of the Gulf States. This is in addition to the fragmentation and polarization of some forces particularly in central Iraq. These developments have created a conviction that Saddam,s regime threat to regional peace is not equal to an unknown danger which might materialise as a result of changing the regime through a popular uprising, bearing in mind that Saddam's regime is in a box, economically and politically, and that the ghost of what has happened during March 1991 is still fresh in the memory of those concerned. Based on this, the US administration has always been hesitant to support any effort that aims at overthrowing Saddam's regime by the mean of armed efforts by the Iraqi opposition.

Even when these convictions are justified, it does not mean that they should be adhered to, particularly when these convictions are related to a regime that cannot and will not learn from its experience, let alone the experience of others. On the contrary, Saddam's regime's moral threats increase daily, using Iraq's resources and exploiting security conditions in the area. That is why Saddam is continuously hostile to the regional and international consensus, and unflinchingly tries to exploit any gap that will allow him to carry out his terrorist and aggressive intentions, as there are probably some indications that he might be involved with the terrorist operations of Al-Qaidah. This makes it imperative that all concerned countries, as well as the Iraqi opposition, should shoulder the responsibility of seriously planning to get rid of this despicable regime, with the least possible cost, taking into account the necessity of alleviating regional and international fears related to the unforeseen dangers that might arise as a consequence of the demise of Saddam's regime.

Summary

The international community should expect from Saddam's regime worse terrorist acts than were committed on 11th September 2001. This is so as Saddam was described by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, as the biggest terrorist in the world. As it is usual with Saddam, those whom he targets are mainly Iraqis, Arabs, and Muslims. Thus, those that are Saddam's usual targets should Afghanistan-type scenario, i.e. arming the opposition by the US, this will not be acceptable in the area and will cause deep concerns. However a military coup (palace coup) will not take place due to the security apparatuses that the regime has created and has spent a large part of the state budget on it. In addition he spreads fear among the members of the security apparatuses by using torture and murder against anyone who falls below the standard laid down for serving Saddam and his family. Also Saddam has conveyed to members of these apparatuses that it is an invincible regime and that it is preferred because regional security cannot be guaranteed without it.

If a popular uprising on the Afghanistan model causes deep regional concerns, as well as the possibility of causing civil war and a military coup is almost impossible, how then can salvation be found from this regime, stability restored to the area and the freedom of the Iraqi people be achieved?

The suggestion in this summary is that the Iraqi opposition is more concerned than any other with the issue of change, and that it should take note of the concerns of the regional countries first, and benefit from past experience, particularly the experience of the uprising of 1991 and not to repeat the mortal mistakes of adopting political slogans and political manifestos that can cause ethnic and sectarian polarization that does not serve the interests of Iraq.

The best path is to study the issues and formulate a watertight plan in coordination with all regional and international powers that are concerned with the Iraqi situation. This should be directed at the forces of the centre in Baghdad (all kinds of military, security and civilian establishments surrounding the regime) and giving it the confidence through military, logistical and information and media support, so as to break the wall of fear and encourage it to move against the regime. I see no difficulty in that, given faithful and honest efforts and intentions.

Chairman of the Iraqi Jurist Association. A former judge, and a former member of the officer corps of the Iraqi Armed Forces.