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80th Anniversary of Iraq's 1920 Revolt
(June 28, 2000)

The Revolt of 1920
By Zaheer A. Kazmi

(This article was written specifically for the Iraq Foundation by Mr. Kazmi)

Few events in the twentieth century have such latent implications for the pursuant process of nation-building as the 1920 Revolt in Iraq. It is, therefore, surprising how such an important legacy is seldom invoked when reflecting upon the contemporary predicament of this troubled country.

Eighty years to the day, on June 30 1920, an insurrection in Iraq was ignited which was to set in motion the first, broad-based popular movement for constitutional reform in the history of the newly forming Arab states. Iraq would have to wait over seventy years - until the intifada of March 1991 - for another such tumultuous expression of the popular will. The intervening period had witnessed an unenviable succession of political upheavals and the incessant erosion of any meaningful sense of civil society, particularly after the Ba'th Party seized power in 1968. The sad plight of Iraq since March 1991 is now well-known. The spectre of the 1920 Revolt, however, and with it the aspiration for self-determination, unity and independence that it embodies, continues to find its place in the collective consciousness of the Iraqi people. At this present critical juncture of Iraq's history, it is fitting to cast our gaze back upon this important event.

The nature of the legacy which the revolt inspired and of the precise motives of its leading agitators has been much debated over the years. Three salient aspects, however, can be isolated which continue to have a resonance today and are pertinent to Iraq's future development - the vital role played by the Shi'a ulema representing the majority Shi'a population; the desire for a more representative and constitutional system of governance free from external interference; and the manifestation of a hitherto unprecedented solidarity between different sectors of Iraqi society, the harbinger of an Iraqi nation.

The foremost proponent of the revolt was Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi - the leading Shi'a mujtahid since the death of Kazim Yazdi in April 1919. Shirazi and his later to be exiled son, Mohammad Ridha, were instrumental in promoting a radical agenda among the Shi'a constituency and in enlisting wider tribal support for the rebellion. The seeds of discontent, however, were sown at the outset of the British invasion of Basra in 1914 and their subsequent occupation of Baghdad in 1917 and, finally, of Mosul in 1918. It was the British presence in Iraq along with the increasingly nationalistic overtones of the Ottomans that precipitated the unrest and catalysed disparate sectors of the populace to unite in opposition to foreign subjugation.

It could be argued that by the end of the Great War there already existed the potential for cohesion. Indeed, the revolt came in the culmination of a period of profound socio-economic change. Under Ottoman rule, Iraq had not been immune to the imperatives of modernity - of technological progress leading to the enhancement of lines of communication and modes of transport, of the emergence of an educated elite, of the private ownership of tribal land, and the formation of political associations. Such developments, as elsewhere, added to the more fluid and permissible environment for creating wider social bonds, an environment that was simultaneously awakening to the incipient call of the Arab renaissance.

The demands that were articulated by Shirazi reflected an awareness of the changing social landscape. Earlier, in a pro-constitutionalist petition at Kerbala on 19 January 1919, he had outlined an inclusivist position on the part the Shi'a religious establishment. He advocated the appointment of a Muslim Arab King, bound by an elected National Assembly whose rules would be approved by the ulema of the nation. Importantly, neither the confessional orientation of the would be King, nor his particular place of origin was specified.

Whilst it may be argued that this strategy was pragmatic, rather than ideological, it nonetheless pointed to the fact that compromise, conciliation and agreement between different elements in Iraqi society was possible - most important of all it showed that Iraqis could engage in politics. The support for the petition of the Sunni ulema of Baghdad and Kazimayn testifies to this. Indeed, many tribal leaders - Sunni, Shi'a and even Kurd - were broadly supportive of the demands.

There are many reports of the co-operation between the Sunni and Shi'a in the run up to the revolt. This was expressed in part in the political poetry of the day. Most notable, were the remarkable nature of the ceremonies during Ramadan which fell between 19 May and 18 June in that year. It had not been, and is still not, uncommon for the Shi'a to convey political grievances during religious occasions such as the commemoration of the martydom of the Prophet's grandson, Imam Hussain. A show of political unity between Shi'a and Sunni, channelled via a shared, co-ordinated commemoration of respective religious ceremonies, however, was a particularly powerful symbol of unity that manifested itself in the summer of 1920.

The revolt itself anticipated fundamental dynamics which, on a wider level, were to shape competing ideas of legitimacy throughout the Arab world for years to come - the role of religion in politics, the position of Arab nationalism in the collective identity of the region and the emergence of a more parochial yet nascent sense of Iraqi nationalism which would be mirrored by subsequent developments in other states of the Arab world. Perhaps the greatest significance of 1920 was the short-lived, yet to some degree successful, reconciliation of these often antagonistic elements of Arab political culture. In this sense, it stands as an example not just for Iraq but for the wider Arab world.

The revolt was finally violently extinguished by the British army who were to live with the vicissitudes such a policy engendered for many years to come until their final departure from Iraq. Yet, the 1920 Revolt, however tragic in its immediate outcome, should also be seen as a seminal moment in the development of the Iraqi nation. A moment which, in light of the events of March 1991, has not been entirely superseded. There are those who may argue that Iraq's inherently divided social structure ultimately militates against any sense of community cohesion among its population. It is equally tenable, however, to suggest that the events set in train in June 1920 and March 1991, whilst containing elements of external agitation, were in essence the spontaneous expressions of the solidarity of the Iraqi people asserting their collective rights in their own land - by and for themselves as a nation.


An IF Overview of the 1920 Revolt

June 30, 2000 marks the 80th anniversary of Iraq's 1920 revolt, a populist movement that included tribes from the mid-Euphrates region, civic leaders, students and clerics, who rose up against the British and demanded full independence for Iraq. Although Iraqis failed to achieve military victory, their efforts culminated in the installation of the Hashemite Prince Feisal as king of Iraq, and the formation of Iraq as a political entity.

The revolt had roots earlier in the century, when two major events heightened political self-awareness among Iraqis. The first was the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, precipitated by Persian mujtahids (Shi'a clerics) who sought to make their government accountable to religion and protect the economic interests of Iranian bazaaris. The Iranian Constitutional Movement impacted the political climate of Iraq because many mujtahids resided in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, and later sought to implement their ideas in Iraq.

The second major event in the political consciousness of Iraqis was the 1908 promulgation of the Turkish Constitution by the Ottomans. This was a series of new laws that allowed considerable freedom of speech and political discussion, and restricted the absolute authority of the Ottoman Sultan.

When WWI proved the deathbed of Europe's sick man, the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans lost control over Iraq and foreign powers rushed in to grab the spoils. By late November 1916 the British had occupied Basra. Mujtahids and tribal shaykhs resented their presence from the start and sought to extirpate them from Iraqi soil. They called for a jihad and cast the effort as a struggle against infidels. The British defeated the jihad and by 1918 their occupation of Iraq was complete. However, their presence could not fill the power vacuum left by the Ottoman departure. Since the mujtahids had asserted power during the constitutional periods mentioned above, they were able to step in and fill the void.

After the war Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points changed the face of international relations by calling for self-determination. In this vein the Iraqi revolutionaries sought independence, and were willing to fight against the British occupiers to obtain it. Britain realized that in this new political climate it could not impose direct administration on Iraq as it had done in India. In 1919 they introduced a plebiscite that asked the Iraqi people what sort of country they preferred, and who they wanted as a leader. The plebiscite revealed that the Iraqi populace was very divided on this issue. But most importantly, it showed that the most powerful mujtahids, as well as prominent nationalist leaders were against continued foreign rule, and were willing to cooperate with each other to oust the British. After the plebsicite, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, a mujtahid in Najaf, emerged as a powerful opponent of British rule and Najaf became a hotbed of opposition.

In May 1920 the San Remo conference gave the British a mandate over Iraq. Mujtahids and other sectors of Iraqi society resented this and still sought to shake themselves free of British tutelage. The British were alarmed at the growing unity between Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. Both began to attend mosques together in Baghdad, delivering a unified message of nationalism and Islam.

Both Sunnis and Shi'a sought a constitutional form of government, calling for an "Arab Islamic state ruled by an Arab Amir bound by a legislative assembly," but interpreted it different ways. The Shi'a mujtahids sought a king who would be accountable to a religious authority. Others, including Sunni notables sought a system that would allow the sons of Sharif Husayn to rule.

Yousif Al Suwaidi, a leader of the 1920 Revolt and later speaker of the Iraqi senate.

On June 30, 1920, the uprising that gained fame as the 1920 Revolt ignited at Rumaytha, Diwaniyya province. This signaled the outbreak of more general hostilities that spread throughout the country and put the British on the defensive. Hotbeds of opposition were centered in Najaf and Karbala, but the revolt was mostly limited to rural areas. The revolt did not include the Tigris valley, where the British presence was very strong, or Kurdish areas, where the Kurds were engaged in their own struggle for independence under the celebrated Mahmud Al-Barzanji of Suleimaniya. But districts north and east of Baghdad were affected, as well as Samarra, Kirkuk and al-Dulaym.

Shaikh Dhari, whose assassination of British Colonel Leachman sparked the 1920 Revolt.

The revolt lasted three months and encompassed one-third of the countryside before the British finally snuffed it out in October. 400 British lives were lost, along with 40 million pounds sterling.


Scene from funeral of Shaikh Dhari

Iraqis continue to view the 1920 revolt as the first popular Iraqi nationalist movement that united Iraqis in their quest for full independence. Although the revolt did not achieve the goal of full independence, it did cause the British to modify their administrative system, and to expend a considerable amount of money to subdue the revolt. It was no longer financially or politically feasible for the British to impose direct rule. In 1921 Feisal bin Husayn, son of the Sharif Husayn of Mecca, and formerly king of Syria, was installed as monarch in Iraq, and Iraq as a political entity was born.

Pictures taken from The Book of Iraq: 700 Old Pictures.

Selected References:

1. Phebe Marr "The Modern History of Iraq."
2. S.H. Longrigg "Iraq, 1900 to 1950."
3. Yitzhak Nakash "The Shi'is of Iraq."
4. Ghassan Al-Atiyyeh "Al-Iraq: Nash'atu Santa."