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The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq
Panel: Ambitions for Iraq?
(November 4, 2002)

Ladies and gentlemen:

My esteemed co-panellists have left little for me to add. Being the only Kurd on this panel, I am culturally tempted to think this is a conspiracy designed to sideline the Kurdish people!

Seriously though, I would like to make two points briefly. The first is a socio- historical one that I believe to be relevant to our discussion today. I subscribe to the views expounded by Iraq's foremost sociologist Ali al-Wardi and the late Princeton Professor Hanna Batatu, that the history of Iraq has been conditioned, if not determined, by the conflict between city and countryside. This conflict is centuries old, and here is not the place to dwell on its intricacies and ups and downs.

Suffice to say that when the British ended Ottoman rule and occupied Baghdad in 1917, they faced the choice of either engaging the ascendant, educated but disunited and not easily controllable urban classes or breathing new life into the existing decaying order of tribes and oligarchies. For reasons of political expediency, or perhaps because of what Robert Kaplan describes as "an intense (British) fascination with…tribal culture that had no precedent", they chose the latter, thus planting the seeds for much of the violence and turmoil that ensued. Although the numerical balance of power has shifted dramatically in favour of the cities since British times, Saddam's regime today is the continuation of a long tradition of hegemony of the countryside over the city; in other words, that of the subjugation of civil society.

The United States has similar options in dealing with post-Saddam Iraq: Either deconstruct the current rancid order and help the country's civil society reconstruct a new one, or enforce a political ratatouille a la Afghan in which Iraq's neo-fascists and assorted have beens, whom some people in this city euphemistically call ex-Ba'thists, would continue to play a prominent role.

I contend that if this were to happen, Iraq's path toward democracy would be seriously hindered and the U.S. would be denied the strategic opportunity of setting the example it so desperately needs in the Muslim world.

My second point follows from the first one. I think it is an insult to common sense to perceive each of Iraq's ethnic and religious communities as cohesive monolithic entities. Today, most of Iraq's Arab Sunni population are horrified at the commonly made suggestion that Saddam's regime is representative of their community. Similarly, members of Iraq's Shi'a Arab urban middle classes have more in common with their Kurdish, Turkemen and Sunni Arab counterparts than they do with their exiled self-appointed leaders. And I am not talking here about the weakness some of them share with me for Chateau Mouton Lafitte 1945!

This, however, should not be construed to mean that there are not those who would fight tooth and nail to turn the battle in post-Saddam Iraq into one contested along ethnic and religious divides. That is their vested interest; their only hope for political survival. The challenge -and it is an awesome one- for Iraqi democrats is to articulate and effectively communicate to their people an all-inclusive vision for their country's future.

The first step in this direction is to endeavour to found forums, institutions and political organisations whose agenda and membership transcend narrow ethnic and religious interests. In sum, we need to convey a democratic "Iraqist" message.

There are reasons to believe that such a message would find a very receptive Iraqi public. The nationalist pan-Arab ideology, which has dominated Iraqi politics since 1963, has lost its attraction for the vast majority of the Iraqi people. So has the Iranian model that was once touted as an alternative to Ba'thism. Even its former protagonists are today denying they are seeking an Islamist state in Iraq.

Moreover, I can report that there is a growing realisation among Kurds that their future prosperity and well-being reside in having a significant stake in Baghdad.

Does all this mean that the battle for democracy in Iraq is winnable?

I claim it is but would add in the same breath that much depends on a long-term U.S. commitment to such an outcome. It will come as no surprise to you that Iraqis of all hues are both sceptical and apprehensive on this count. After all, it is not long ago that American government policy was to keep the Iraqi people locked "in a cage" with their tormentor. Indeed, there are still those who advocate its pursuance.

Over the past decade, Iraqis have come to understand that the battle of Baghdad cannot be won without winning that of Washington. In the latter case, we are in dire need of the help of all Americans who believe that U.S. national interests lie in promoting human rights and democratic values beyond its borders.

Ladies and gentlemen, I put it to you that if such assistance was forthcoming, we could take care of the rest.

Comments presented by Siyamend Othman